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“Tribal Trenches”: A Qualitative Critique of 
Consociational Design in Northern Ireland
Sarah Hollmann
Stetson University
Abstract
 How does consociational power sharing impact ethnic divisions in Northern Ire-
land? Though those in the consociationalist school would claim that the lack of active 
political violence in Northern Ireland is a powerful argument in favor of consociational-
ism; I argue that active violence has been replaced by increasing political polarization and 
ethno-national tensions. Using data gathered from twenty-four semi-structured interviews 
in Northern Ireland, this project critiques the hypothesis that ethnic divisions lose their 
salience after the implementation of consociational power-sharing agreements after ethno-
nationalist conflict. Despite the growing literature on the long-term effects of consocia-
tionalism, scholars have largely focused on quantitative methods, overlooking qualitative 
approaches. By presenting an ethnographically based critique of consociationalism, I hope to 
approach this gap in the literature. This research was generously funded by both the Stetson 
University Research Experience Grant and by the Stetson Honors Program.
Keywords
 Northern Ireland, consociationalism, ethnic tribune parties, Northern Irish 
Assembly
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Introduction
The Belfast Agreement was a political fudge because it didn’t actually address 
the issue of the land. It said that if people sign up to work together politically, 
then all will be reasonably well, we can look forward to progress, whatever 
that means. And yes, the violence largely disappeared, the economy has stag-
gered along, but as we have seen, when pressure comes politically, then 
tribes revert to their identity (Reverend Thomas, July 25, 2017).
I think that now, more than ever we’re seeing a real brazen attempt by both 
parties to play constitutional issues and others to get people into more tribal 
trenches (Nichola Mallon, July 17, 2017).
While the guns have been quiet for almost twenty years in Northern Ireland, the sectarian 
division that spurred the Troubles lives on. During the height of the Troubles, this division 
was expressed through violence. Now, ethno-national actors have moved from the bomb to 
the ballot box. As exampled in the two quotes above, sectarian political division has become 
the status quo. Through the consociational design of the Northern Irish executive, identity 
has been codified in the constitution and political process (Taylor, 2006). Consociational-
ism, or ethnic power sharing, has designated ethno-national identity as a valid political ori-
entation. Political parties act as “ethnic tribunes”, focusing on issues of ethnicity rather than 
issues of cross-community interest (Dixon, 2011; McGlynn et. al, 2014). 
 How does consociational power sharing impact ethnic divisions in Northern Ire-
land? Through a qualitative study of twenty-four elite and non-elite interviews conducted 
between June and July 2017, I posit that consociationalism has in fact exacerbated tensions. 
Rather than a silver bullet for ethno-nationalist tensions, consociational design has insti-
tutionalized ethnic identity, empowered ethnic tribune parties, and led to an institutional 
neglect of the “other”.
Literature	Review
Theoretical Basis of Consociationalism
 Consociational democracies are a form of power sharing in divided societies first 
engineered in the 17th century, popularized by Arend Lijphart in the 1960s (Saurugger, 
2014). Distinct from majoritarian democracies, consociational democracies share the four 
following traits: grand coalitions of elites, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental au-
tonomy (Sircar, 2006). 
 Despite the face-value common sense of consociational design, it is not without 
its critics. The tenets of segmental autonomy and grand coalitions of elites are particularly 
critiqued by Paul Dixon. He writes: “The objection to consociationalism, then, is not so 
much its four prescriptions but consociationalism’s theoretical framework – primordialist, 
segregationist, elitist – in which these prescriptions are to be interpreted” (2011, p. 312). 
These three objections, that consociationalism is primordial, segregated, and elite, form the 
crux upon which objections to consociationalism exist.
History of Northern Irish Troubles
 Dating back to exclusionary laws passed in the 16th century after the Plantation of 
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Ulster by British settlers, the Catholic Irish faced discrimination in the north of Ireland. In 
1920, the island of Ireland was partitioned into the independent, mainly Catholic/Irish/
nationalist south and the two-thirds Protestant/British/loyalist north, a self-governing re-
gion within the United Kingdom (Phoenix, 2017). While the Troubles have many causes, 
the constitutional status of Northern Ireland has been the most important issue for both 
sides since the partition of 1920. Predominantly Catholic nationalists yearn for a united Ire-
land, while predominantly Protestant unionists want to maintain the union with the United 
Kingdom (MacGinty et. al, 2012). 
 After centuries of brewing conflict, sectarian violence escalated in the 1970s, lead-
ing to: “a three-cornered conflict between the British Army and a militarized police force… 
the Irish Republican Army… and pro-United Kingdom militant groups…” (MacGinty et. 
al, 2007, p. 4). Ultimately, 3,700 people were killed and 40,000 people were seriously in-
jured by the time of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, a significant number considering 
the small population of Northern Ireland (Deiana, 2012).
The Assembly and Consociationalism in Northern Ireland
 The history of power sharing in Northern Ireland as a way to alleviate sectarian 
tensions began with the Sunningdale Agreement of 1974. The agreement, mediated in late 
1973, lasted all of six months before internal divisions within the unionist and nationalist 
communities waylaid the agreement (McDaid, 2016). After Sunningdale and several other 
unsuccessful attempts at self-government, Northern Ireland agreed upon the Good Friday, 
or Belfast Agreement (the Agreement) on April 10, 1998. The Agreement was primarily 
championed by the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), the “moderate” nationalist 
party, and the Ulster Unionist Party, the “moderate” unionist party. Finally, the Agreement 
was adopted by popular vote in 1998 (MacGinty et. al, 2012).
 The Agreement contained three strands. Strand One creating a consociational As-
sembly and Executive, Strand Two creating North-South institutions cooperating with the 
Republic of Ireland, and Strand Three creating East-West institutions cooperating with the 
United Kingdom. Finally in the Agreement, any decision as to the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland would rest not with the Assembly, but with the electorate (Northern Irish 
Assembly). 
 The Assembly holds 108 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), elected 
by Single Transferrable Vote proportional representation (Wilford, 2000). Each MLA must 
designate themselves as “Unionist,” “Nationalist,” or “Other.” These designations are used 
when special voting is triggered that requires cross-community support, a key tenet of the 
consociational setup. Within the Executive, parties are allocated ministries proportionally 
through the d’Hondt method, while the first and second largest party choose the joint First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister (Murtagh, 2015).
 In its brief life, the Assembly has had a tumultuous history. The Assembly has been 
suspended over failures in devolution from 2002 until 2007, and more recently, from 2017 
to the present day (Northern Irish Assembly). The roots of the 2002 failure of devolution 
and subsequent St. Andrews Agreement lie within the transferal of power from the more-
centrist SDLP and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) to Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP). After the 2005 election in which both the DUP and Sinn Fein consolidated 
their majorities, Ian Paisley, the head of the DUP, “announced that they represented the 
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‘burial’ of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement on which the peace process is based, and he 
ruled out a return to a power-sharing assembly” (Sluka, 2009, p. 281). 
 After this bold statement from Paisley, power sharing was restored in May 2007 
(Owen, 2006). Most recently, power sharing has been suspended since January 2017 over 
the involvement of Arlene Foster, the current DUP First Minister, in the failed Renewable 
Heating Initiative. As of May, there is no agreement in sight. Sinn Fein is currently demand-
ing that the Irish language be recognized as an official language, which the DUP is not likely 
to agree on (McDowell, 2017). As Sluka states:
 While so- called ‘terrorism’ and armed conflict have been reduced, part of the
 cost has been the movement of electoral support away from moderation
 and towards more militant wings of unionism (the DUP) and nationalism
 (Sinn Fein)… (2009, p. 297).
The current conflict over cultural and political issues in the context of a constitutional gov-
ernment falls in line with some of the main arguments against consociationalism. 
Criticisms of Consociationalism in Northern Ireland
 In 1975, after the failed consociational Sunningdale Agreement, Lijphart himself 
discounted consociationalism as a viable option for Northern Ireland. He stated that North-
ern Ireland lacks three factors “conducive to consociational democracy”: a balance of ethnic 
power, norms of grand coalitions, and national solidarity (p. 100-1). He held that view until 
1995, when the IRA ceasefire and consequent Good Friday Agreement proved a victory 
for consociationalists (Dixon, 2011). Criticisms of the consociational setup of Northern Ire-
land abound, but the most relevant include the essentialist nature of consociationalism, the 
prevalence of ethnic tribune parties, and institutional neglect of the “Others.” 
 Perhaps the most interesting critique of consociationalism involves the essentialist 
assumptions that consociational scholars make. Following structural identity theory, one’s 
identity is “socially constructed and changes over the life course” (White, 2010, p. 342). 
Furthermore, “‘ethnic groups’ are defined by the context in which they find themselves… 
Ethnic identity can be crafted from within a group as a response to a changing political en-
vironment or the frustrations of the modern industrial state” (Denny and Walter, 2014, p. 
200). While ethnic identity does not lose salience immediately following a conflict, neither 
does it remain fossilized throughout one’s life.
 While the goal of consociationalism is that such identities would eventually lose 
their salience, the means by which that would occur are unspecified. It is important to ac-
knowledge that Sinn Fein and the DUP have moderated their positions by embracing mod-
ern electoral politics, however they still function as ethnic tribune parties (Whiting, 2016; 
Mitchell et. al, 2009). According to McGlynn et. al, ethnic tribune parties act by “rallying 
supporters to their badge on the basis that only they can maximize the benefits for ‘their’ 
community” (2014, p. 275). As Evans and Tonge write in 2013, “electors and parties across 
the two ethnic pillars concur on economic and social priorities, such as jobs and housing, 
but select ‘Green’ (Catholic–Irish–Nationalist) or ‘Orange’ (Protestant–Unionist–British) 
parties” (p. 364). Though such tribune parties had begun during the Troubles, the institu-
tionalization of such parties through consociationalism has amplified their legitimacy.
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 While the construction of the Northern Irish Executive grants the same powers 
to the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, whether the First Minister is designated as 
Nationalist or Unionist still matters deeply. In the 2010 General Election, Sinn Fein’s vote 
share outpaced the SDLP by 9%. That year, 61% of the electorate responded that Sinn Fein 
“has been the most effective voice for nationalists in Northern Ireland” (McGlynn et. al, 
2014, p. 282). 
 It is not necessarily the difference in policy between the “moderate” and “ex-
treme” parties that determines vote choice, but rather, the perception that the “extreme” 
parties are the heavyweight defenders of their community. In 2009, Mitchell et. al found: 
“three times as many respondents perceived Sinn Féin rather than the SDLP to be the most 
effective party in representing the interests of nationalists (p. 411). Among unionists, they 
found similar phenomena (Mitchell, 2009). Voters elect these “extremes” as the voice for 
their community due to the perception that they are the most effective. 
 While “moderate” parties such as SDLP and UUP are left behind by ethnic tribune 
voting, non-sectarian parties such as the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) are also 
left behind by the consociational setup of the Assembly. As of 2015, 43% of the electorate 
identified as neither unionist nor nationalist, yet unionist and nationalist political parties rep-
resent 90% of the vote (Murtagh, 2015, p. 545). In the 2016 election, Alliance maintained 
their eight seats, but lost support in every constituency (Bertoldi, 2016). This phenomenon 
is largely attributed to the culture of politicized ethnicity; even if a person doesn’t actively 
identify with an ethnic group, they will still vote for the party that most closely represents 
their ethnicity (Murtagh, 2015). While the electorate is an issue for the cross-ethnic parties, 
the institutional design of the Assembly proves an insurmountable obstacle. The process of 
cross-community vote and mutual veto mean that the designation of “other” holds little 
to no significance. In 2001, three APNI members were re-designated as Unionist rather 
than Other in order to shore up the Unionist majority for a cross-community vote (Taylor, 
2006). Ian O’Flynn states: “By effectively discounting the votes of the ‘others’ on certain 
important issues, the agreement privileges national over individual identities” (Taylor, 2006, 
p. 217). One APNI member said that trying to legislate as a cross-ethnic party was akin to 
being in the “middle of a tribal dog fight” (Murtagh, 2015, p. 559). By not providing an 
institutional method for cross-ethnic parties to thrive, consociational design falls short in its 
aim to decrease the salience of ethnic tribune parties. The problem with consociationalism 
is not in its use as a tool of conflict management, but rather in its long-term use. Intended to 
be a transitional tool, the failure in consociationalism lies in its inability to articulate a means 
to ameliorate ethnic divisions.
 Through these three arguments, critics of consociationalism argue that it amounts 
to voluntary segregation (Dixon, 2011; Taylor, 2006). Through separate control of min-
istries and community control of cultural issues, what consociationalists call “segmental 
autonomy” (Sircar, 2006, p. 13), in fact works as de facto segregation. Rupert Taylor of-
fers one of the more scathing rebuttals of consociationalism when he questions: “If notions 
of ‘separate but equal’ could not be intellectually upheld through any appeal to reason or 
developed through any accepted principles of social organization in the American South or 
in apartheid South Africa, why should it be any different for Northern Ireland?” (2006, p. 
219).
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Defenses of Consociationalism in Northern Ireland
 While consociationalism has certainly been heavily critiqued, it has also been heav-
ily defended. The core of this defense hinges on the lack of widespread sectarian violence 
and the moderation of Sinn Fein and the DUP. In Bosnia, another state in which a conso-
ciational agreement led to a ceasefire, Stroschein states: “Despite much criticism of the con-
sociational structures established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the state has not collapsed 
again into violence after nearly 20 years” (2014, p. 112). In this argument, consociationalism 
is defined not by the presence of democratic norms, a functioning legislature, cross-ethnic 
voting, or any of the other lofty goals that consociational scholars claim, but merely by the 
absence of violence. This speaks to the use of consociationalism as a conflict management 
tool rather than a true tool for conflict resolution. 
 While consociationalism may not designate a method to facilitate ethnic recon-
ciliation, it points to the presence of ethnic cooperation as one of its defenses. Using the 
involvement of Sinn Fein and the DUP in the Assembly, consociational scholars cite the 
moderation of these once-unconstrained parties as a testimony to the efficiency of consocia-
tionalism. In this way, the bare minimum standard of peacekeeping is hailed as a victory of 
consociational design. This is not to belittle the enormity of the Agreement; to wage peace 
after almost forty years of waging war is no small feat. Rather, this is to say that twenty years 
after the cessation of violence, the political process has replaced the Armalite as the weapon 
of choice for ethnic actors. 
Consociationalism in Comparative Perspective
 Consociational thought has permeated the world of peacemaking, proposed as 
a “pragmatic” option for divided states. Consociational power sharing is actively utilized 
in Belgium, Burundi, Malaysia, Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, and Switzerland, and has 
heavily influenced the post-conflict constitutions of Bosnia, Cyprus, Fiji, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Macedonia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe (McCulloch, 2014). 
 Of the above consociational nations, Bosnia-Herzegovina is perhaps the most 
compared to Northern Ireland. Both are European states in the early stages of recovering 
from an ethno-national conflict, and finalized consociational peace treaties with invested 
states as guarantors: Northern Ireland with the UK and Republic of Ireland, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina with Serbia and Croatia. The contrast emerges in both the severity of the wars 
and the number of constituent groups involved. While Northern Ireland was a low-level 
armed conflict, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina escalated to the point that many scholars 
consider it to be genocide. In addition, Northern Ireland has two main constituent groups: 
Unionists and Nationalists. Bosnia-Herzegovina contains three: Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks 
(Sircar, 2006). Despite these differences, the similarities are pronounced. Many of the con-
sociational structures that draw ire in Northern Ireland are equally contentious within the 
constitutional design of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The marginalization of the “others”, ethnic 
tribune parties, and continued political unrest attract criticisms from scholars (Stroschein, 
2014).
Methodology
 The data for this paper comes from twenty-four semi-structured interviews con-
ducted between June and July of 2017. The audiotaped interviews lasted between ten and 
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sixty minutes, and were conducted in the location of the participant’s choosing. Inter-
views were conducted in participant’s offices, coffee shops, and even the Member’s Café at 
Stormont Parliament Building. Data were then imported into Quirkos, a qualitative data 
software package, where they were coded by theme and relevancy. All participants were 
guaranteed confidentiality with the exception of four elected officials, who kindly waived 
their right to confidentiality. 
 Participants for this study were recruited through cultural, historical, religious, 
and political organizations. Participants ranged from church volunteers to Mike Nesbitt, 
the former leader of the UUP (Interviews, Appendix). While interviews were largely con-
versational, a semi-structured interview guide was constructed to direct the flow of discus-
sion and keep the conversation centered on identity and consociational design. Questions 
included: “Do you believe that the importance of sectarian divide has diminished over your 
lifetime?”; “What do you think caused the shift from the UUP and SDLP in favor of the 
DUP and Sinn Fein?”; and “In your opinion, why are people voting on ‘orange and green’ 
issues instead of ‘bread and butter’ issues?” (Interview Guide, Appendix). 
 Instead of focusing on either the unionist or nationalist community, this paper 
focuses on a cross-community, national study. This is a unique decision, as most qualitative 
surveys of Northern Ireland choose to focus on one community in a confined geographical 
space as a pragmatic decision (Zenker, 2006; Panzer, 2015; McAuley and Tonge, 2008). In 
contrast, respondents ranged the religious spectrum from Protestant to Catholic to Pagan, 
the geographical spectrum from Derry to Belfast to North Down, and the political spectrum 
from avowed loyalist to dissident republican. While this approach did limit my depth of 
community immersion, it made up for it in breadth. By analyzing viewpoints of those across 
the religious, social, and political spectrum, this paper is able to execute a more comprehen-
sive critique of consociationalism.
 While the breadth of my study is one of its strengths, it is also one of its weak-
nesses. I was able to speak to four current or former MLAs: two Alliance, one SDLP, and 
one UUP. I was not, however, able to arrange an interview with any DUP or Sinn Fein 
officials. As this paper specifically critiques Sinn Fein and the DUP, interviews with party 
leaders would have greatly aided my analysis. However, the interviews with party officials 
in smaller parties, other elites, and supporters of Sinn Fein and DUP were still wide-ranging 
enough to be confident in the results. 
Findings	and	Analysis
 Through my interviews, I analyze the ways in which consociational power shar-
ing has affected the political and social dimensions of post-Troubles Northern Ireland. In 
particular, this paper will delve into the institutionalization of ethnic identity, prevalence of 
ethnic tribune parties, and institutional neglect of the other inherent in consociationalism.
Institutionalization of Ethnic Identity
 My findings on the impact of consociationalism on ethnicity fell in line with the 
existing literature critiquing consociationalism (Dixon, 2011; Denny and Walter, 2014). Dr. 
Stephen Farry, the Deputy Leader of the Alliance Party and MLA for North Down, stated:
You have this paradox now, that the Good Friday Agreement and the peace 
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process has actually hardened identity… Basically the Agreement has es-
sentially institutionalized sectarianism. It treated identity in 1998 as a fixed 
point rather than something that was fluid and could change. It assumed that 
there would be a permanent Protestant-Unionist identity and a permanent 
Catholic-Nationalist identity, and that the two would have to coexist. And 
therefore, they built in the structures that would have to give voice to them, 
but didn’t really recognize any other kind of voice … Sometimes it’s easier 
for peacemakers to freeze conflict and manage it rather than to try to trans-
form it. The freezing can then become really frozen (Dr. Stephen Farry).
Farry falls in line with the literature on the essentialist nature of consociationalism when 
he states that consociationalism “freezes ethnic conflict.” The essentialist nature of conso-
ciationalism makes it impossible to move past the conflict. Likewise, “Reverend Thomas” 
echoes:
No matter what you make of power sharing, it entrenched sectarianism, it 
entrenched division. You have to nominate yourself as either being unionist, 
nationalist, or other. You have to define yourself…(“Reverend Thomas”).
By requiring one to define oneself as unionist or nationalist in perpetuity by default causes 
ethnic divisions to replicate. By not providing a viable alternative to the unionist/nationalist 
dichotomy, the Agreement ensures that the division will remain salient, and erase those who 
do not identify within that dichotomy. Errol, a civilian police administrator, states:
Well, Northern Ireland, we’re special. I am perceived to be from a Protestant 
background. The fact that I myself can best be described as agnostic with 
Pagan leanings is irrelevant. I am a Prod. The organization I work for classi-
fies me as being from a Protestant background, because you’re either Prod or 
you’re Catholic. That I’m a Pagan doesn’t wash. That I’m an atheist doesn’t 
wash… (Errol).
In stating that his identities “don’t wash” with public perception, Errol points out the essen-
tialism present within consociationalism. He is not allowed to embrace his self-identities, as 
consociationalism only allows for the dual structure of nationalism or unionism, Protestant-
ism or Catholicism. Will Glendinning, a former Alliance MLA, states:
The Good Friday Agreement has been extremely good at providing a struc-
ture for us to deal with, at a governmental level, the divided structure of our 
society. It was also necessary for us to cement the peace, in terms of reduc-
ing the level of violence. What it didn’t do was deal with the identity issues: 
dealing with the past, parades, flags, and paramilitaries, which are the issues 
that are now there (William Glendinning).
In this way, it is not necessarily the structure of the Agreement, but it’s shortsightedness. 
While the Agreement ended the war, it did not necessarily end the conflict. The Agree-
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ment, while essential to end the violence, did not contain the long-term structures that 
would ameliorate ethnic tensions, and has in fact amplified tensions through the institution-
alization of identity inherent to the consociational structures underpinning the Agreement. 
Ethnic Tribune Parties
 In addition to the institutionalization of ethnicity, my findings reflect how the 
consociational structures of the Agreement have empowered ethnic tribune parties. Nichola 
Mallon, the deputy leader of the SDLP and MLA for North Belfast, states: 
I think that more than ever we’re seeing a real brazen attempt by both par-
ties to play constitutional issues and others to get people into more tribal 
trenches. I think that what we have seen is that the center ground, in this 
past Westminster election in particular, was badly impacted upon (Nichola 
Mallon).
In using the phrase “tribal trenches”, Mallon is hearkening back to both the primordialism 
underlying consociational design and the ways in which ethnic tribune parties are quick to 
use that to their advantage. 
 Since the Agreement in 1998, the DUP has moved from 20 to 28 seats in 2017 
(Whyte, 2002; BBC). Sinn Fein has advanced from 18 to 27 seats (Whyte, 2002; BBC). 
Meanwhile, the UUP and SDLP have declined by 18 and 12 seats, respectively. Dr. Farry 
explains the move towards tribune parties by stating:
To an extent, both DUP and Sinn Fein have moved to the center. They’re 
not where they were 25 years ago… To some extent they’ve taken over the 
SDLP and UUP’s territory, but you also have the electorate seeing them 
as being the stronger voice in each community. So it’s what [scholars] talk 
about when they write about ethnic tribune parties on either side of the di-
vide who are there to broker outcomes in a transactional process rather than 
create some sort of a notion of a shared, coherent, cohesive government. 
They’re there to represent their different blocs. So if your politics is going to 
be divided into blocs, you’re as well having the stronger voice in your bloc, 
so you’ll be able to stand up to the equal but opposite voice in the other 
community (Stephen Farry).
Not only does Dr. Farry reference the literature on ethnic tribune parties; he also talks about 
the “notion of a shared, coherent, cohesive government.” The perceived impossibility of 
cooperation amongst tribune parties is closely associated with the institutionalization of 
ethnicity under the Agreement. 
 By designating candidates as “unionist”, “nationalist”, or “other”, the choreogra-
phers of the Agreement were all but guaranteeing that the existing ethnic divisions would 
give rise to tribune parties (Mitchell et. al, 2009). While the violence has ended, the ethnic 
divisions remain salient through the consociational design of the Assembly. While the politi-
cal process includes all relevant parties in the conflict, fear is still a significant component of 
modern electoral politics in Northern Ireland. As Reverend Thomas states:
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So why do you vote for these people? You vote for them because they’re 
making you fearful that the world will end if the other lot gets in… Neither 
the SDLP nor the UUP were able and still are not able to articulate why 
people should vote for them, and not the other party. The policy differen-
tials between say, the SDLP and Sinn Fein, in practice, are minimal. So, as 
the DUP and Sinn Fein have said, ‘we are the heavyweight operators in our 
communities,’ why would anyone vote for someone who A, can’t dislodge 
them, and B, really has no credible alternative to offer the electorate? (“Rev-
erend Thomas”).
Likewise, Mike Nesbitt echoes this idea of block voting, stating:
As I see it, you basically now have unionists who don’t even necessarily like 
the DUP voting DUP because they are fearful of Sinn Fein becoming the 
First Minister; they always want a Sinn Fein Deputy First Minister, even 
though it’s an equal office… So it seems to me that people vote DUP or 
Sinn Fein not because they think these are the two parties that can come to-
gether and make a big impact on how we deal with our crisis in the National 
Health Service, or will deliver a better education system for our children, or 
actually deliver anything except cancel each other out. So there’s a realiza-
tion that them’uns on the other side are gonna have a big block called the 
DUP or Sinn Fein, therefore we have to make sure us’uns have a big block 
to cancel them (Mike Nesbitt).
Both Nesbitt and Reverend Thomas articulate the core of ethnic tribune parties: that they 
are ethnic actors that “lie beyond the formal political sphere, within the informal structures 
of ethnic politics” (Murtagh, 2015, p. 545). Within these informal structures, fear and the 
realities of tribune politics weigh heavily on the electorate, overshadowing “bread and but-
ter” policy. As Bishop John states:
Even moderate nationalists will say, ‘to be on the safe side, let’s vote for Sinn 
Fein.’ And a moderate unionist will say, ‘to counter that, I’ll vote for the 
DUP’ (Bishop John).
In an example of the back-and-forth inherent to consociational design, William, a DUP 
voter in Derry/Londonderry states: 
Even though I voted DUP, it doesn’t mean I agree with all of their policies. 
People would say that’s wrong, but I think that’s what you do here, you 
vote for the strength, and hopefully they’ll represent the unionist people… 
(William).
In reluctantly voting for DUP for “strength”, William exemplifies the core of ethnic tri-
bunes; to consolidate control through ethnic, rather than policy-based appeals. Ethnic tri-
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bune parties are not about changing the status quo of government; they are about control. 
Unionists seek to maintain their control, while nationalists seek to gain control. As Glendin-
ning states: 
The last Westminster election shows that we’re heading towards polariza-
tion and a benign apartheid because the vote… showed people voting for a 
party not necessarily because they believed that party, but because that party 
is the one they see will stand up to the other. So there’s still a lot of defining 
yourself by who you’re not (Will Glendinning).
In the term “benign apartheid,” Glendinning joins the ranks of critics of consociationalism 
in maintaining that consociational design separates and reifies rather than accommodates. 
Rachel, a young woman in Derry/Londonderry, states: 
In areas that is majority Protestant, they don’t want Sinn Fein getting in, in 
areas that is Roman Catholic, they don’t want DUP getting in, so it’s tacti-
cal voting. That’s what is happening in Northern Ireland, and that’s the way 
it has been and the way it seems to be for years to come. That’s just what 
people have gotten used to over the years. Even the people who go out and 
vote for Alliance or UUP, they go out and vote for those parties, but they 
know nothing will be done. And it just seems in Northern Ireland that no 
matter who you vote for, it’s just going to be the same, there’s not going to 
be changes (Rachel).
Rachel’s statement highlights not only the transactional nature of ethnic tribune parties, but 
also the hopelessness of the consociational system. Though consociationalism is an adequate 
post-conflict bandage, it will lead to consequences such as ethnic tribune parties if left un-
checked and unaltered.
Institutional Neglect of the “Other”
 Murtagh writes: “In the landscape of ‘ethnic politics’ in which parties mirror the 
divisions in society and vie for votes only within ‘their own’ ethnonational group… parties 
that attempt to straddle the divide inhabit a perilous position” (2015, p. 545). According to 
recent electoral returns, that sentence rings particularly true for the Alliance. While ethnic 
identification is down, with only 57% of the electorate identifying as either unionist or 
nationalist, traditionally unionist or nationalist political parties still garner 90% of the vote 
(Murtagh, 2015, p. 545). Bishop John reconciles this disconnect succinctly, stating: 
With the demographics in Northern Ireland right now, it’s almost fifty-fifty, 
so the small parties get squeezed out in elections. It’s kind of like an arm 
wrestle between the two parties, and there’s no such thing as a three-person 
arm wrestling match (Bishop John).
In short, even if one does not actively identify with an ethnic tribune party, one will still 
vote for the identity that most closely resembles their heritage. Reverend Thomas delves 
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more deeply into the issue, stating:
This is where Alliance is floundering, because, and I used to be an Alliance 
voter, and I can’t think of a single issue where their party position is not 
reflected in either Sinn Fein or DUP to some extent… no matter what you 
are or aren’t in favor of, at the end of the day you are presented with an 
identity choice, not a choice about moral differentials, it’s an identity choice 
(“Reverend Thomas”).
By once again referencing the lack of meaningful policy differentials, Reverend Thomas 
reiterates the importance of ethnicity in vote choice. 
 In addition to the barriers within the electorate, cross-community parties face in-
stitutionalized barriers as well. If the Alliance were to garner enough votes to claim either 
the First Minister or Deputy First Minister spots, nation-wide chaos would ensue. As Dr. 
Stephen Farry answers:
SKH: Out of curiosity, what would happen if Alliance were to take one of 
the First Minister spots?
Stephen Farry: Anarchy, absolute anarchy. Technically, we could claim one 
of the posts, but whichever community was bumped out, that would cause 
tensions. But that’s part of the problem with the setup; it assumed that union-
ists and nationalists would exist in perpetuity. They never really thought that 
far ahead… How would the structures cope with that?... 
In this quote, it becomes obvious that the three main issues facing consociationalism in 
Northern Ireland: institutionalization of identity, ethnic tribune parties, and neglect of 
cross-ethnic parties, do not exist in isolation. Instead, these factors interact and build off of 
one another in a vicious cycle. 
Conclusion	and	Discussion
 While the combat in Northern Ireland is over, the conflict lives on via political 
means.  Consociational power sharing has prevented a return to violence, but at the cost of 
an effective government. As of May 2018, there has been no sign that the Assembly would 
reconvene after a more than yearlong impasse. One SDLP lawmaker went so far as to tell 
the New York Times: “I don’t mean to be dramatic or anything, but I do think the Good 
Friday Agreement is effectively dead,” (Kingsley, 2017). Under consociationalism, North-
ern Ireland has been embattled by the institutionalization of ethnicity, ethnic tribune parties, 
and neglect of the other. 
 This is a turning point for Northern Ireland. With the ghosts of the Troubles and 
the looming specter of a solidified border from Brexit, the peace cemented through the 
Good Friday Agreement will either sink or swim. Let us only hope that the region will not 
return to the violence that marked it twenty years ago. 
 My research uncovered a number of further questions. How has Brexit affected 
identity? How would a single-community study have affected my findings? How would 
my findings been affected if I had been able to interview a party official of Sinn Fein or the 
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DUP? These questions would be interesting additions to the literature.
 Through the institutions created in the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland 
has gone from a nation mired in war to a nation mired in cultural conflict.  While conflict 
of the cultural variety is preferable to the armed variety, the mere absence of violence is 
not a high enough bar for transitional societies. By applying principles of conflict man-
agement as opposed to principles of conflict transformation, long-lasting reconciliation is 
overlooked in favor of post-conflict stagnation. The shortsighted consociational framework 
of the Good Friday Agreement has led to institutionalized ethnicity, tribune parties, and 
neglect of cross-ethnic parties, none of which are conducive to the peaceful and cohesive 
society that Northern Ireland hopes to become.
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Appendix
Interview Guide
•	 Tell me about your life growing up. What do you remember about Northern 
Ireland at the time?
•	 Where is your family from?
•	 Where did you grow up?
•	 How do you remember the 1970s-1990s? What was going on around you?
•	 Do you identify with a faith tradition? Which one?
•	 Do you identify as Irish, British, European, Northern Irish or something else, and 
why?
•	 Do you believe that the importance of the sectarian divide has diminished over 
your lifetime?
•	 Why do you think that people are voting on orange and green issues instead of 
bread and butter issues?
•	 What do you think caused the shift from the UUP and SDLP in favor of the DUP 
and Sinn Fein?
Interviews
Derry/Londonderry
•	 “Elizabeth”, June 19, 2017
•	 “Jimmy”, June 19, 2017 
•	 “Susie”, June 19, 2017 
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•	 “Donal”, June 20, 2017
•	 “Brandon,” June 20, 2017
•	 “Seamus”, June 21, 2017
•	 “Steven,” June 21, 2017
•	 “Billy,” June 21, 2017
•	 “Ross”, July 7, 2017
•	 “William”, July 7, 2017
•	 “James”, July 8, 2017
•	 “Jack”, July 8, 2017
•	 “Bishop Joseph”, July 24, 2017 
Belfast
•	 “Errol”, June 29, 2017
•	 Mike Nesbitt, July 14, 2017 *
•	 “Bill”, July 15, 2017
•	 “Rachel,” July 15, 2017
•	 “Bob,” July 15, 2017
•	 Nichola Mallon, July 17, 2017 *
•	 “Andrew,” July 21, 2017
•	 “Reverend Thomas,” July 25, 2017 
•	 “Bishop John”, July 25, 2017 
•	 Will Glendenning, July 26, 2017 *
Bangor
•	 Dr. Stephen Farry, July 19, 2017 *
* Political figures: signed non-confidentiality clause
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